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Abstract
Multi-product firms dominate production activity in the global economy. There is widespread
evidence showing that large corporations improve their efficiency by increasing the scale of their
operations; this objective can be realized either by consistently investing in R&D or by expanding
the product range. In this paper, we explore the implications of this fact by embedding multi-
product firms in a General Equilibrium model of endogenous growth. We analyze an economy
with oligopolistic firms that carry out in-house R&D programs in order to achieve cost-reducing
innovations. Market structure is endogenous in the model and is jointly determined by the num-
ber of firms and the number of product varieties per firm. Both economies of scope and scale
characterize the economic environment. We show that the market equilibrium involves too many
firms (too much inter-firm diversity) and too few products per firm (too little intra-firm diversity);
moreover, we find out that the total number of products and productivity growth are inefficiently
low under laissez-faire. The nature of these distortions is discussed in detail.
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1 Introduction
Worldwide evidence shows that ﬁrms build their market position not only by
investing in Research and Development (R&D) but also by expanding their
product lines. Production activity is dominated by large multi-product enter-
prises;1 to give an idea of the importance of this phenomenon, Bernard, Jensen
and Schott (2005a) observe that ﬁrms with more than one product line gener-
ate over 90% of U.S. manufacturing output and account for over 95% of U.S.
exports. Despite this empirical evidence, most of the macroeconomic litera-
ture has not shed enough light on this issue. For instance, the Chamberlinian
monopolistic competition model, with the well-known Dixit-Stiglitz formula-
tion (Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977), has been extensively used in growth theory:
under this formulation, each ﬁrm is restricted to produce only one product
and strategic interactions between ﬁrms are not taken into account.2 The
monopolistic competition model provides a good representation of industries
characterized by a large number of small ﬁrms producing only one product;
however, it is not suitable for markets with enterprises producing a large set
of varieties.
In this paper, we develop an R&D-based growth model that extends the
Dixit-Stiglitz framework of product diﬀerentiation to allow for multi-product
ﬁrms and strategic interactions.
On the demand side, we consider a nested CES utility function for the
diﬀerentiated products; at this regard, we assume that varieties produced by
a single ﬁrm are better substitutes for one another than varieties produced by
diﬀerent ﬁrms. On the supply side, producers choose the size of their product
range (the level of product proliferation) and engage in process innovation (in-
house R&D) in order to lower their production costs; technological progress is
measured by the average rate of cost reduction. Firms compete in the product
market under the Bertrand mode of competition by ﬁxing the prices of the
varieties produced. The economic environment presents both economies of
scope and scale as we model both ﬁrm-level and variety-level ﬁxed costs;3 a
1Although ﬁrms may decide to specialize and produce a single variety, mono-product
ﬁrms represent the exception rather than the rule (Teece, 1994).
2On this point, Lancaster (1990) observes: “An important limitation on the Dixit-Stiglitz
and other neo-Chamberlinian models is that ﬁrms make no product choice − it is as though
each ﬁrm, as it enters the group, is assigned a product by random choice (without replace-
ment) from an urn containing blueprint for all possible products”, (Lancaster, 1990, page
194). (The italics are ours.)
3In our model, in fact, the presence of the ﬁrm-level ﬁxed cost allows each ﬁrm to
produce several diﬀerent products with lower unit costs than if they had been produced in
independent ﬁrms. The reader is referred to Bayley and Friedlaender (1982) for an extensive
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free entry condition determines the mass of ﬁrms. The mass of ﬁrms and
the mass of varieties per ﬁrm jointly characterize market structure and are
endogenously determined in equilibrium together with the rate of economic
growth.
The model-setting considered in the present paper belongs to the class of
creative accumulation models that have started to become popular in growth
theory after the contributions of Smulders and van de Klundert (1995) and
Peretto (1996).4 During the last decade, these authors have developed a novel
framework which makes explicit the link between industrial organization (IO)
and growth theory and is suitable for capturing the interdependence between
market structure and economic growth. In these models, the mass of ﬁrms
changes in response to market and technology conditions and is endogenously
determined; in addition, market structure aﬀects the returns to innovation
of proﬁt-seeking ﬁrms and plays a crucial role in explaining the economic
performance of the economy. It is important to observe that, in these models
market structure is measured only by the mass of ﬁrms which can be supported
in equilibrium; these authors deal with mono-product ﬁrms and, consequently,
the degree of product variety is determined simply by the mass of ﬁrms. We
contribute explicitly to this literature because we break the identity between
the mass of varieties and the mass of ﬁrms by shedding light on the choice of
product range; the latter represents an important component of ﬁrm size and,
together with the mass of ﬁrms, determines market structure in our model.5
The analysis of multi-product ﬁrms presents some interesting features that
are worth mentioning here. First, when a ﬁrm introduces a new variant of
its product line, there is a trade-oﬀ between the beneﬁt of attracting a larger
number of customers and the cost of cannibalizing its existing products. Sec-
treatment of the economies of scope.
4An important growth model that takes market structure seriously is the one of Thomp-
son (2001); diﬀerently from Smulders and van de Klundert (1995) and Peretto (1996), the
structure of the model in Thompson (2001) is stochastic and is suitable to capture ﬁrm’s
heterogeneity.
5Since the product range represents an important determinant of ﬁrm size, the level of
ﬁrm’s proliferation plays a role in one of the two “Schumpeterian hypotheses”, that is the
one regarding the relation between innovation and ﬁrm size. Product diversiﬁcation is an
argument that is often put forward in support of the role of large enterprises in innovation:
in fact, a large multi-product ﬁrm can realize a higher yield on the resources devoted to R&D
projects. The expected proﬁt of R&D eﬀort is positively aﬀected by the degree of ﬁrm’s
diversiﬁcation, it is argued, because a widely diversiﬁed enterprise is better able to exploit
its research output and appropriate the returns associated with technological activities (see,
e.g., Kamien and Schwartz, 1982, Chapters 2 and 3). A remarkable, seminal contribution
to the understanding of ﬁrm growth through product diversiﬁcation is given by Penrose
(1959).
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ond, each multi-product ﬁrm tries to internalize demand linkages between all
the varieties it produces. Finally, ﬁrms can use their product range as an in-
strument to mitigate competition by aﬀecting the pricing-production decisions
of rivals; the reason why it happens is that an increase in the level of a ﬁrm’s
proliferation reduces the prices of other ﬁrms. Naturally, all these eﬀects are
not at work under the standard assumption of single-product ﬁrms and are
crucial in the comparison between social optimum and decentralized economy.
At this regard, we highlight a welfare cost implicit with imperfect competition
and multi-product ﬁrms; the magnitude of this distortion is endogenous and
is the result of the interdependence between market structure and economic
growth.
In Proposition 1, we show that the market equilibrium involves too many
ﬁrms (over-entry) and too few products per ﬁrm (too narrow product range)
with respect to the social optimum; in addition, we ﬁnd out that the mass
of product varieties is ineﬃciently low under laissez-faire. Intuitively, the
divergence between the decentralized economy and the social optimum can
be explained as follows. Entrants do not take into account in their decisions
that entry lowers the proﬁts of all ﬁrms because of a decline in market share
for each ﬁrm. Since there is interdependence between the entry decision of a
potential competitor and the choice of product range, a new entrant leads to a
contraction of existing ﬁrms’ product ranges and this, in turn, induces entry.
Consequently, the market results in excessive ﬁrms’ entry and too little product
variety. Variety-level ﬁxed costs play a crucial role in generating the sub-
optimality result of this economy: entry lowers ﬁrms’ proﬁts and incumbents
reduce their costs by choosing fewer varieties. In fact, when the product range
is narrower, the burden of proliferation ﬁxed costs that each ﬁrm has to sustain
becomes smaller. In contrast, the social planner internalizes the fact that more
entry reduces proﬁts of incumbents. Consequently, in the social optimum entry
is lower; higher proﬁts support higher proliferation ﬁxed costs, and therefore,
more variety.
In Proposition 2, we focus on the growth performance of the decentralized
economy and we show that there is insuﬃcient growth under laissez-faire. The
reason why this occurs is that increasing returns to scale in R&D are internal
to the ﬁrm and the rate of growth depends on the scale of the R&D program
of the individual ﬁrm. Since the mass of ﬁrms is high in the decentralized
equilibrium, the amount of R&D per ﬁrm is low. This leads to lower average
R&D which reduces the rate of growth. In the social optimum, instead, average
R&D is larger and economic growth is higher. Our analysis suggests that
market structure is excessively fragmented in the decentralized equilibrium;
this reduces the ability of ﬁrms to apply resources to innovation and hurts
3
Minniti: Multi-product firms, R&D, and Growth
Published by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2006
economic growth.
It is interesting to compare these welfare results with the ones obtained
in some related papers. Van de Klundert and Smulders (1997) develop a
growth model with two sectors, a high-tech sector with diﬀerentiated goods
and a traditional sector with a homogeneous good. The economy is aﬀected
by three distortions. First, oligopolistic ﬁrms face a price elasticity of demand
that is lower than the elasticity of product substitution. Second, there is
distortionary pricing due to the fact that high-tech ﬁrms, diﬀerently from tra-
ditional ﬁrms, set prices higher than marginal cost in this two-sector economy.
Third, there are knowledge spillovers across ﬁrms. Though no clear conclusion
emerges with respect to the mass of product varieties, the authors show that
economic growth is too low under laissez-faire; in our model we also ﬁnd that
ﬁrms under-invest in R&D but, diﬀerently from van de Klundert and Smulders
(1997), the result is not generated by technological spillovers between ﬁrms.
In order to focus on the eﬀect produced by strategic interactions on growth
and welfare, Peretto (1999) develops a growth model with only one sector and
abstracts from knowledge spillovers between ﬁrms.6 In the normative analysis
of his model, the author ﬁnds out that the market provides too much variety
and too little growth. Our model, that shares with Peretto (1999) the absence
of knowledge spillovers and likewise is based on a one-sector economy, shows
that allowing ﬁrms to produce more than one variety changes signiﬁcantly the
welfare analysis; in fact, R&D under-investment is now accompanied by too
little product variety.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews some re-
lated literature on multi-product ﬁrms in IO and international trade: here, we
discuss the main contributions and outline the links with the present paper.
Section 3 lays out the growth model we use in the analysis. Sections 4 and
5 develop respectively the welfare analysis and the comparison between the
market equilibrium and the social optimum. Finally, Section 6 gives the con-
clusions and suggests further questions for research. All the main calculations
are relegated in two Appendices.
6In the one-sector economy, in fact, oligopolistic pricing does not give rise to distortions
across industries, since all goods are priced in the same way.
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2 Related literature
2.1 The industrial organization literature
A part from some notable exceptions by Anderson and de Palma (1992, 2006),
Ottaviano and Thisse (1999), and more recently Ju (2003), most of the lit-
erature on IO treats the determination of the equilibrium mass of ﬁrms and
the choice of product range as two separate issues. Some papers deal with
product line selection by multi-product ﬁrms while keeping both the number
of ﬁrms and the number of varieties per ﬁrm exogenous (see, e.g., Brander and
Eaton, 1984). Other papers deal with the formation of multi-product ﬁrms
while taking the total number of product varieties ﬁxed (see, e.g., Wolinsky,
1986; Shaked and Sutton, 1990). Finally, some works explore the choice of the
size of product range in diﬀerentiated markets while holding the number of
ﬁrms constant (see, e.g., Raubitschek, 1987; Champsaur and Rochet, 1989).
We diﬀer from these papers because market structure is endogenous in our
analysis; in fact, the equilibrium mass of ﬁrms and the mass of product vari-
eties per ﬁrm are jointly determined. At this regard, we outline two interesting
features of our model. First, we allow for intra-ﬁrm competition because each
ﬁrm co-ordinates its pricing decisions across all the varieties that it produces
in order to maximize overall proﬁts. When a ﬁrm creates a new variety, there
is a reduction in the demand for all the other substitute varieties the ﬁrm pro-
duces (the cannibalization eﬀect); therefore, each producer has to internalize
competition within its product line. Second, we assume that ﬁrms produce a
non-negligible set of varieties and take into account the eﬀects of their pricing
decisions on the industry’s price index, while taking the prices of all other ﬁrms
as given (the strategic interaction eﬀect);7 this means that we also allow for
inter-ﬁrm competition. Firms behave like oligopolists and not as monopolistic
competitors as in the standard Dixit-Stiglitz framework.8
Intra-ﬁrm decision coordination and inter-ﬁrm competition are two key-
features of Anderson and de Palma (1992, 2006) and Ottaviano and Thisse
(1999); these authors propose diﬀerent models to study the performance of
multi-product ﬁrms. Anderson and de Palma (1992) analyze a nested multi-
nomial logit model that has been extensively used in empirical studies in IO.
Ottaviano and Thisse (1999) consider a quadratic utility model which gen-
erates a linear demand system. Anderson and de Palma (2006), recently,
revisit their seminal contribution within a general nested demand structure.
7In this regard, we follow Yang and Heijdra (1993).
8In oligopoly, in fact, ﬁrms are large actors and interact in a more strategic way than in
the case of monopolistic competition.
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Our model, instead, shares the same consumers’ preferences of Ju’s model
(2003); however, it is important to observe that Ju (2003) explores only the
comparative-static properties of the nested CES Dixit-Stiglitz model without
undertaking any welfare analysis.9
We notice that, with the exception of Ottaviano and Thisse (1999), all
these works are based on partial equilibrium models. In the present paper,
instead, we develop our analysis into a general equilibrium (GE) setting; we
remark this diﬀerence by mentioning the advantages of using such a structure.
First, a GE framework makes clear that ﬁrm compete not only for sales on
the product market, but also for resources. Second, in such a setting the
determination of demand and saving is endogenous. Finally, a GE setting
guarantees that feedback eﬀects from growth to market structure and vice
versa, working mostly through the labor market, are fully captured.10
2.2 The international trade literature
In the international trade literature, theoretical work has started shedding
light on multi-product ﬁrms only recently. Baldwin and Ottaviano (2001) ex-
amine the determinants of foreign direct investment and model trade patterns
between two multi-product multinationals into a partial equilibrium setting.
In their two-country model, the authors consider one multi-product enterprise
per country and show how multinational ﬁrms have the incentive to place some
of their factories abroad in order to mitigate the cannibalization eﬀect which
any given variety produces upon other varieties manufactured by the same
enterprise.
Bernard, Redding and Schott (2005b) introduce multi-product ﬁrms into a
GE model of comparative advantage and ﬁrm heterogeneity. The authors show
that trade liberalization encourages ﬁrms to focus on their core competencies,
reducing the range of products manufactured, and increasing the range of
products exported. Movements of resources across product lines within ﬁrms
generate a new source of welfare gain from trade, and provide an additional
source of reallocation in response to trade liberalization.
In a related paper, Eckel and Neary (2005) analyze how multi-product ﬁrms
9Allanson and Montagna (2005) propose a model which shares many features of the one
proposed by Ju (2003) in order to explore the proposition that a shift from a fragmented
market structure to a more concentrated equilibrium is induced by industry shakeout. The
main diﬀerence between these two works is that Allanson and Montagna (2005) rule out
strategic interactions in ﬁrms’ pricing and product range decisions.
10For further discussion of the advantages of using a GE setting, the reader is referred to
Peretto (1999).
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react to trade liberalization; in particular, the authors focus on the intra-ﬁrm
adjustments that take place in a multi-product ﬁrm after a change in the
economic environment (for instance a change in factor prices). The analysis
proposed by Eckel and Neary features how these intra-ﬁrm adjustments aﬀect
the demand for labor and, related to that, explains how induced changes in
the wage rate inﬂuence the optimal product range.
Diﬀerently from these works, we do not deal with trade but with innovation;
in-house R&D and accumulation of ﬁrm-speciﬁc knowledge are the key-features
of the growing economy in the present paper.
3 The model
3.1 Basic framework
Our analysis is based on a creative accumulation model which is inspired by
the works of van de Klundert and Smulders (1997) and Peretto (1999); these
authors have developed GE growth models characterized by strategic interac-
tions in the production (pricing) decisions of ﬁrms competing on the product
market. We also allow for strategic interactions between ﬁrms; additionally,
our model presents a second crucial feature, that is the full internalization of
the cannibalization eﬀect by multi-product ﬁrms.
In the following, we present the model; ﬁrst, we describe consumers’ pref-
erences (the demand side), and then, we focus on technology (the supply side).
3.1.1 Consumption
We analyze a one-sector economy populated by a ﬁxed amount, L, of identical
individuals who supply labor services and consumption loans in competitive
labor and capital markets. The typical consumer is endowed with one unit of
labor that is supplied inelastically. He chooses consumption C to maximize
lifetime utility:
U(t) =
∫
∞
t
e−ρ(τ−t)
C(τ)1−σ
1− σ
dτ , (1)
subject to the usual ﬂow budget:
A˙(t) = r(t)A(t) + W (t) + D(t)−E(t),
where ρ > 0 is the rate of time preference, σ > 0 is the inverse of the in-
tertemporal elasticity of substitution, A(t) is assets holding, r(t) is the rate
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of interest, W (t) is the wage rate, D(t) is dividends, E(t) ≡ C(t)q(t) is to-
tal expenditure and q(t) is the aggregate consumption price index. The only
ﬁnancial asset available to individuals is ownership shares of ﬁrms (stocks).
In the economy, consumers own ﬁrms in equal shares and receive proﬁts as
dividends. Throughout the paper, we take labor as nume´raire and normalize
the wage rate to unity.
C(t) is a composite good that is diﬀerentiated in two dimensions; there are
m multi-product ﬁrms that are producers of diﬀerentiated goods:
C =
(∫ m
i=0
x
θ−1
θ
i di
) θ
θ−1
, θ > 1, (2)
where θ is the across-ﬁrms elasticity of substitution and the composite good
of ﬁrm i, xi, is:
xi =
(∫ ni
j=0
x
δ−1
δ
ij dj
) δ
δ−1
, δ > 1, (3)
where xij is the production of variety j by ﬁrm i.
11 In Eq. (3), one can
observe that ﬁrm i produces a mass of varieties, ni; the elasticity of substitution
between these diﬀerentiated goods is δ. The product varieties are grouped into
nests with the degree of substitutability between varieties within nests being
higher than the one between nests, that is δ > θ; all the varieties in a nest are
produced by the same ﬁrm. At this regard, it is interesting to observe that
the literature on multi-product ﬁrms have considered two alternative industry
conﬁgurations (see, e.g., Brander and Eaton, 1984). In the ﬁrst, denoted
as the market segmentation case, each nest i ∈ [0, m] corresponds to a ﬁrm
and a typical manufacturer produces a mass of ni close substitute varieties
of the good. In the alternative case, denoted as market interlacing, each
nest i ∈ [0, m] consists of varieties produced by diﬀerent ﬁrms, with each
manufacturer producing less closely related products; in this case the typical
nest i is occupied by a mass ni of ﬁrms. The speciﬁc characteristics of the
product market under analysis are crucial for the choice between these two
alternative industry conﬁgurations. In this paper, we assume that the products
of a ﬁrm are perceived by consumers to be closer substitutes to each other than
to those of other ﬁrms and, therefore, we analyse the market segmentation
case.12
11One can observe that even if we consider a continuum of ﬁrms, the multidimensionality
of the ﬁrm’s product range implies that each manufacturer is likely to behave as a large
actor that strategically operates on the product market.
12This model aims to describe mature industries in which the trademark is the primary
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The solution for the optimal expenditure plan is represented by the stan-
dard Euler equation which describes the savings policy and gives the optimal
time path of consumption:
C˙
C
=
1
σ
(
r − ρ−
q˙
q
)
, (4)
where r is the nominal rate of interest.
The representative consumer decides the consumption of each variety within
nest i and therefore, maximizes xi subject to the expenditure constraint on
the products of ﬁrm i,
∫ ni
j=0
pijxij dj ≤ Ei. The resulting demand function for
each variety j in nest i is given by:
xij =
Ei
pδijq
1−δ
i
, (5)
where the price index that corresponds to ﬁrm i, qi, can be written as:
qi =
(∫ ni
j=0
p1−δij dj
) 1
1−δ
. (6)
Finally, the consumption decision over each nest is taken and the representative
consumer maximizes C subject to the budget constraint on composite goods,∫ m
i=0
qixi di ≤ E; this gives:
xi =
E
qθi q
1−θ
, (7)
locus of diﬀerentiation with other speciﬁc product attributes being of secondary importance;
Allanson and Montagna (2005, page 591) make a similar assumption by stating that sub-
stitutability between varieties is higher within nests than between nests; Anderson and de
Palma (1992, page 265) also assume that products within a group are more similar than
products belonging to diﬀerent groups. From the empirical side, it is important to outline
that both the degree of product diﬀerentiation and ﬁrm diﬀerentiation are unobserved to
the econometrician; consequently, the econometric procedure estimates both product and
store diﬀerentiation as unknown parameters. The empirical IO literature analyzes the issue
of whether we should expect greater diﬀerentiation (less substitutability) within a particular
ﬁrm or among diﬀerent ﬁrms; according to Richards and Hamilton (2005), the speciﬁcity
of the market taken into account seems to be crucial in this respect. The restaurant trade
is an example of a segmented market; in fact, customers ﬁrst choose which restaurant to
patronise and then select speciﬁc items from the menu. On the contrary, in the supermarket
example, retailers sell products that ﬁll many diﬀerent needs, with each store selling roughly
similar types of products; therefore, substitution across stores is likely to be greater than
within stores.
9
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where the aggregate consumption price index, q, equals:
q =
(∫ m
i=0
q1−θi di
) 1
1−θ
. (8)
Since Ei = qixi and there are L identical consumers, Eqs. (5) and (7) give the
aggregate demand of variety j produced by ﬁrm i:
Xij = Lxij =
LE
q1−θpδijq
θ−δ
i
. (9)
The demand for the individual variety depends negatively on its price and
positively on both the nest-level and industry-level price indexes.
To conclude, we observe that the representative consumer behavior may
be treated as the outcome of a three-stage utility maximization procedure.
In the ﬁrst stage, the consumer optimally allocates consumption expenditure
over time. In the second and third stages, consumption decisions are made
respectively over the varieties within each nest and over nests.
3.1.2 The production of goods and R&D activity
Each ﬁrm is characterized by a productivity level that changes over time
through a cost reduction process driven by the accumulation of ﬁrm-speciﬁc
knowledge.
Labor input is used in the production of each diﬀerentiated good and in
the R&D activity. The production of a unit of good Xij requires labor lxij and
ﬁrm-speciﬁc knowledge hi, that is:
Xij = lxijhi. (10)
R&D is an in-house activity and results in productivity increases; we do not
model spillovers of the fruits of R&D, so that ﬁrm-speciﬁc knowledge is com-
pletely tacit. For ﬁrm i, knowledge simply accumulates according to the fol-
lowing equation:
h˙i = ϑlrihi, (11)
where ϑ > 0 is the research productivity parameter and lri is labor input
employed in research activities by ﬁrm i. We observe that h˙i is the ﬂow of
product-speciﬁc knowledge generated by an R&D project. The R&D technol-
ogy exhibits increasing returns to scale to knowledge and labor and constant
returns to scale to knowledge, the accumulated factor. This ensures that con-
stant growth is feasible in the steady-state.
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The choice of this R&D technology prevents us from studying some inter-
esting issues related to the presence of knowledge spillovers across ﬁrms. We
could introduce these technological externalities in the model but this would
complicate the welfare analysis without adding to the basic insights. Since the
objective of the present paper is to focus on the presence of strategic inter-
actions in an oligopolistic environment populated by multi-product ﬁrms, we
prefer to keep knowledge spillovers out from the analysis.13
3.2 Incumbent ﬁrms
Multi-product ﬁrms face the same production and R&D technologies and de-
mand schedules; they start out with the same knowledge level and behave
non-cooperatively on the product market. In the short-run, market structure
can be characterized by a given mass of ﬁrms m. We model ﬁrms’ decisions
as a two-stage game. In the ﬁrst stage ﬁrms choose the mass of varieties to
produce, and so they determine the size of their product range. In the sec-
ond stage they compete in price and choose the amount of research labor.
In order to determine the short-run market equilibrium, we solve the model
by backward induction using the subgame Nash perfect equilibrium concept.
Free-entry, instead, determines the long-run equilibrium of the economy.
3.2.1 Second stage of the game
Firms need a ﬁxed amount of labor, equal to lf , for promoting each variety
produced; in addition, a ﬁxed amount of labor, equal to lk, is necessary to
sustain production at any level of product proliferation. The size of each
ﬁrm’s product range is limited by the variety-level ﬁxed cost lf which gives
rise to scale economies at the variety level. On the contrary, the ﬁrm-level ﬁxed
cost lk is related to ﬁrm-speciﬁc activities and generates economies of scope
by providing an incentive for the ﬁrm to produce a large mass of varieties.14
The instantaneous proﬁts of ﬁrm i at time τ can be written as:
πi(τ) =
∫ ni
j=0
[
pij(τ)−
1
hi(τ)
]
Xij(τ) dj − lri(τ)− nilf − lk.
An incumbent ﬁrm i chooses the price pij and the research labor lri for every
variety j ∈ [0, ni] for a given level of proliferation ni in order to maximize the
13We refer to van de Klundert and Smulders (1997) for a welfare analysis dealing with
this issue.
14Marketing, management services and distribution are examples of ﬁrm-speciﬁc activities.
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discounted present value at time t of the ﬂow of proﬁts:
Πi(t) =
∫
∞
t
R(τ)πi(τ) dτ , (12)
where R(τ) ≡ e−
∫ τ
t
r(s) ds is the cumulative discount factor. This maximization
problem is subject to the demand schedules Eq. (9), the production technology
Eq. (10) the research technology Eq. (11), hi(t) = h¯ > 0 (the initial knowledge
level is given and equal for all ﬁrms), hi(τ) for all τ  t given for all j = i
(the ﬁrm takes as given the R&D paths of its rivals), and h˙i(τ)  0 for τ  t
(knowledge accumulation is irreversible). Since consumers own ﬁrms in equal
shares, asset holdings A(t) are equal to
∫ m
i=0
Πi(t)/L di.
We assume that ﬁrms act as Bertrand-Nash competitors and internalize the
so-called cannibalization eﬀect ; more precisely, each producer, when setting the
prices of its own varieties, takes into account that a reduction in the price of
one of the varieties that it produces generates a fall in the demand for all its
other varieties. Moreover, since producers are not small relative to the size of
the market, they take into account the eﬀects of their pricing decisions on the
industry’s price index, while taking the prices of all other ﬁrms as given. A
Nash equilibrium in prices emerges, with each ﬁrm choosing a pricing rule for
each variety within its nest.
In Appendix A3 it is shown that a typical ﬁrm i charges the same price for
all the varieties within its nest, that is pij = pi for every j ∈ [1, ni]:
pi =
1
hi
[θ − i(θ − 1)]
(θ − 1) (1− i)
, (13)
where i, the market share of ﬁrm i, is equal to:
i =
qixi
E
=
(
qi
q
)1−θ
=
n
1−θ
1−δ
i p
1−θ
i(∫ m
i=0
n
1−θ
1−δ
i p
1−θ
i di
) .
Given the pricing strategy Eq. (13), the Lerner index of market power, which
determines the magnitude of the mark-up over marginal cost, can be easily
derived, that is:
pi − 1/hi
pi
=
1
θ − i(θ − 1)
,
meaning that the market power of a ﬁrm is lower the smaller is its market
share.15
15This index provides an appropriate measure of competition toughness, as deﬁned by
Sutton (1991): the lower is the mark-up rate, the tougher is the competition on the product
market.
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Now, we turn at the accumulation process of ﬁrm-speciﬁc knowledge. Each
ﬁrm invests in R&D in order to improve its level of productivity; Appendix
A3 shows that the rate of return to R&D investment equals the following
expression:
rR&D = ϑ
∫ ni
j=0
lxij dj. (14)
One can observe that the right hand side of Eq. (14) represents the eﬀect of
innovation on the cash ﬂow and gives the cost-reducing eﬀect of knowledge
accumulation.
3.2.2 First stage of the game
In the ﬁrst stage of the game, ﬁrm i, anticipating the subsequent price com-
petition, determines the level of proliferation ni taking as given the mass of
competitors. Firms play a Nash game with each other; this means that, when
a typical ﬁrm i chooses its product range, it takes as given the product ranges
of all other ﬁrms.
Now, given the pricing strategy Eq. (13), the gross proﬁts of ﬁrm i can be
written as:16
πi = LE
[
1−
θ
(θ − 1)
1
pihi
]
− lri − nilf − lk. (15)
Firm i maximizes this expression with respect to ni. The ﬁrst order condition
(FOC) for the proﬁt-maximizing choice of product line, ∂πi/∂ni = 0, can be
written as:
LE
θ
(θ − 1)
1
p2ihi
∂pi
∂ni
− lf = 0. (16)
The beneﬁt of expanding the product range is given by the ﬁrst term on
the left hand side of Eq. (16): the creation of a new product increases the
ﬁrm’s market share, leading to higher proﬁts and larger incentives to create
new products. However, more products involve higher proliferation costs; the
second term on the left hand side of Eq. (16), in fact, gives the cost of creating
one more variety.
3.2.3 Entry
As mentioned above, the market is characterized by free-entry; in addition, we
assume that ﬁrms present zero scrap value. Now, diﬀerentiating ﬁrm’s value
16For the details of this calculation, look at Appendix A4.
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Eq. (12) with respect to time and rearranging terms yields:
r =
πi
Πi
+
Π˙i
Πi
, (17)
which is a perfect-foresight, no-arbitrage condition for the equilibrium in the
capital market. It says that the rate of return to ﬁrm ownership is equal to the
rate of return to a riskless loan of size Πi. The two terms on right hand side of
Eq. (17) are respectively the ratio between proﬁts and the ﬁrm’s stock market
value and the capital gain (loss) from the stock appreciation (depreciation);
the sum of these two terms gives the rate of return to ﬁrm ownership.
Firms consider entry when Πi > 0 and exit when Πi < 0. Since entry and
exit are not costly, the mass of ﬁrms is a variable that is free to jump and
an instantaneous equilibrium with free entry and exit exists whenever Πi = 0,
which implies Π˙i = 0. Multiplying Eq. (17) by Πi gives the instantaneous zero-
proﬁt condition, πi = 0, for all values of the interest rate, r; this condition
determines the long-run equilibrium mass of ﬁrms.
3.2.4 Symmetry
From now on, we restrict our attention on the symmetric equilibrium. Be-
fore proceeding, we discuss in some detail the nature of this equilibrium. In
the dynamic game described above, ﬁrms that enter the market commit to
time-paths of pricing, product range, R&D spending and knowledge accumu-
lation; the Nash equilibrium of this game is given by the ﬁrst order conditions
of all active ﬁrms. Assuming that ﬁrms start out with the same knowledge
level implies that the model is symmetric in the fundamentals that ﬁrms face
and in the starting values of the state variables. Since the dynamic behav-
ior characterizing each ﬁrm is governed by identical equations and boundary
conditions, the rate of knowledge accumulation is the same for all the ﬁrms;
this guarantees the symmetry of the Nash equilibrium at all times. Since the
ﬁrm’s Hamiltonian is linear in R&D investment, the bang-bang strategies yield
that ﬁrms jump to their symmetric steady state (immediate convergence) if
investment is unconstrained. In GE investment is constrained by the saving
behavior of households; this implies that it is necessary to study the ﬁrm-level
transitional dynamics to the symmetric steady state if ﬁrms start out with
diﬀerent initial knowledge stocks. Since the microeconomic dynamics of the
Nash equilibrium are not crucial to the aggregate analysis we perform in this
paper, assuming that ﬁrms start out with the same knowledge level is needed
to simplify the analysis.
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Now, imposing symmetry across ﬁrms means that each producer presents
the same market share, that is i = 1/m for every i ∈ [1, m]. This implies
that, in the second stage of the game, the price of each diﬀerentiated good can
be written as:
p =
1
h
[(m− 1)θ + 1]
(θ − 1) (m− 1)
, (18)
where h is the level of knowledge that is identical across ﬁrms. Given this
pricing rule, the Lerner index of market power amounts to m/ [(m− 1)θ + 1].
In addition, plugging Eq. (18) into Eq. (15) makes instantaneous proﬁts equal
to:
π =
LE
[(m− 1)θ + 1]
− lr − nlf − lk, (19)
where lr and n are respectively the research investment and the product range
of a typical ﬁrm. The term LE/ [(m− 1)θ + 1] represents the gross-proﬁt
eﬀect ; it is equal to revenue per ﬁrm, LE/m, times the Lerner index of market
power, m/ [(m− 1)θ + 1]. One can observe that the latter tends to 1/θ as
m becomes inﬁnitely large: this means that if ﬁrms are atomistic, markups
become exogenous as in monopolistic competition.17 The gross-proﬁt eﬀect is
decreasing in the mass of ﬁrms m because the market share and the markup
are lower the larger is m; in addition, it is decreasing in the inter-ﬁrm elasticity
of substitution θ because oligopoly markup is lower the higher is θ.
Turning to the ﬁrst stage of the game, under symmetry the FOC for the
problem of maximization of ﬁrms’ proﬁts with respect to the level of product
proliferation becomes:18
LE
[(m− 1)θ + 1]
·
(θ − 1) (m− 1)
(δ − 1)m
·
mθ (m− 1)
[mθ(m− 1) + θ − 1]
= nlf (20)
On the left hand side of Eq. (20) we individuate two eﬀects: the gross-proﬁt
eﬀect and the expansion eﬀect. The latter eﬀect consists of two terms. The
second term on the left hand side of (20) depends positively on the rivals’ total
market share (m− 1) /m; in fact, there are increasing possibilities to steal
business from the rivals through product proliferation when the population
of ﬁrms gets larger. We observe that this term is lower than one; this is
because in the choice of its product range, each ﬁrm takes into account that
the introduction of a new variety raises the ﬁrm’s own price and is detrimental
for the sales of the ﬁrm’s existing varieties (cannibalization eﬀect). The third
17As we will see, this issue is important at the light of the fact that many feed-backs of
the model are based on the endogenous nature of markups.
18Look at Appendix A4 for the calculations.
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term on the left hand side of (20) captures the eﬀect of a change in the mass
of varieties of a producer on the pricing decisions of other ﬁrms; obviously, it
is increasing in the mass of ﬁrms m because the eﬀect produced on the rivals’
behavior is negligible when the mass of competitors is large. This term is
also lower than one. The reason is that an increase in the level of a ﬁrm’s
proliferation reduces the prices of other ﬁrms; consequently, each producer
tends to under-expand its product range in order to limit price competition in
the second stage (strategic interaction eﬀect).
Rearranging Eq. (20), we write the mass of varieties per ﬁrm as:
n =
LE (m− 1)2 (θ − 1) θ
lf (δ − 1) [(m− 1)θ + 1] [mθ(m− 1) + θ − 1]
. (21)
In the symmetric short-run equilibrium, where the mass of producers, m, is
given, the level of product proliferation is inversely related to the ﬁxed cost
associated with the launching of a new variety, lf . An increase in the intra-
ﬁrm elasticity of substitution between varieties, δ, has a negative eﬀect on n;
the reason is that the importance of the cannibalization eﬀect, which drives
down the level of ﬁrm’s proliferation, grows as a ﬁrm’s varieties become more
substitute. Conversely, an increase in the inter-ﬁrm elasticity of substitution,
θ, inﬂuences positively the size of product range. In order to stress this point,
we observe that two forces emerge as θ gets larger. From one side, the gross-
proﬁt eﬀect decreases; the market becomes more competitive and markups get
smaller by reducing ﬁrms’ returns to expand their product range. From the
other side, the expansion eﬀect increases: the eﬀectiveness of expanding the
level of ﬁrm’s proliferation and stealing customers from other ﬁrms is higher
the larger is the inter-ﬁrm elasticity of substitution θ. Simple computation
shows that the second force always dominates the ﬁrst one leading ﬁrms to
increase the level of product proliferation. Finally, n tends to zero when m
tends to inﬁnity meaning that each ﬁrm wants to sell a single product (formally,
a zero measure set of varieties) when the mass of ﬁrms becomes very large;
this implies that the two dimensions of diversity (intra-ﬁrm and inter-ﬁrm) are
substitutes.
Under symmetry, the growth rate of ﬁrm-speciﬁc knowledge takes a very
simple expression; using Eq. (11), it amounts to:
g = ϑlr (22)
By using Eq. (14), the rate of return to R&D activity becomes:
rR&D = ϑnlx, (23)
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where lx represents the amount of labor needed to produce one variety; it is
important to observe that ﬁrm size is equal to nlx and depends positively on
the product range n. Equation (23) shows that the larger is ﬁrm size, the
larger is the return to R&D activity; intuitively, the beneﬁt of undertaking
a cost-reducing innovation within a ﬁrm depends positively on the mass of
varieties upon which such an innovation can be implemented.
To conclude, we plug Eq. (22) into Eq. (19); imposing π = 0 gives the
instantaneous zero-proﬁt condition:
LE
[(m− 1)θ + 1]
−
g
ϑ
− nlf − lk = 0. (24)
In a zero-proﬁt equilibrium, ﬁrms just break even; each producer spends all
its cash ﬂow, net of variable and ﬁxed labor costs, on R&D activity.
3.3 General equilibrium
In order to discuss the main results of the paper, we focus on the balanced
growth path (BGP) state where the growth rate of labor productivity and the
allocation of workers between activities are constant. The GE of the model
is determined as follows. We ﬁrst impose labor and capital market clearing;
these conditions yield an equilibrium relation denoted as CME. Next, we build
a locus where labor market clears and ﬁrms choose their proﬁt-maximizing
mass of varieties; this relation is labeled as PR. Both curves, CME and PR,
describe the BGP of the economy when the mass of ﬁrms is exogenous. Finally,
we derive an equation, denoted as ZP, by using jointly the zero-proﬁt condition
and the labor market clearing condition.19 The BGP of the economy with an
endogenous mass of ﬁrms is given by the crossing of these three loci.
3.3.1 Labor and capital market equilibrium
To get an expression for employment in production, we substitute the pricing
strategy Eq. (18) into the cost function Eq. (10), using the demand schedule
Eq. (9), and aggregating over ﬁrms. This gives the aggregate quantity of
production labor Lx:
Lx = mnlx =
(θ − 1) (m− 1)
[(m− 1)θ + 1]
LE. (25)
19CME, PR and ZP stand for capital market equilibrium, product range and zero proﬁt
respectively.
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Denoting aggregate R&D as Lr, labor market clearing requires that L = Lx +
Lr+mnlf +mlk; using Eqs. (22) and (25), the labor market clearing condition
can be written as:
L
m
=
(θ − 1) (m− 1)
[(m− 1)θ + 1]
LE
m
+
g
ϑ
+ nlf + lk. (26)
Now, we turn to the capital market. In this market, each agent lends ﬁnancial
resources to ﬁrms and obtains a rate of return to savings that has to be equal
to the rate of return to investment in order to ensure capital market clearing.
Let us consider the rate of return to R&D ﬁrst. Using Eq. (25) into Eq.
(23), one can write rR&D as:
rR&D = ϑ
(θ − 1) (m− 1)
[(m− 1)θ + 1]
LE
m
.
It is important to note that the eﬀect of cost reduction on cash ﬂow can be
decomposed into two terms: (i) the gross-proﬁt eﬀect discussed above (the
term LE/ [(m− 1)θ + 1]); and (ii) the business-stealing eﬀect which gives
the increase in market share achieved by undertaking R&D (the term ϑ(θ −
1) (m− 1) /m). Diﬀerently from the gross-proﬁt eﬀect, the business-stealing
eﬀect increases with the mass of ﬁrms m; the reason is that there are increas-
ing possibilities to steal business from the rivals’ total market share when the
mass of ﬁrms gets larger. The business-stealing eﬀect is increasing in the inter-
ﬁrm elasticity of substitution θ because the eﬀectiveness of a cost-reduction in
attracting customers is higher the more homogeneous are the products oﬀered
by diﬀerent ﬁrms.
In order to determine the rate of return to savings, we proceed as follows.
We get the growth rate of consumption expenditure by plugging the savings
policy Eq. (4) into E˙/E = C˙/C + q˙/q, that is:
E˙
E
=
r − ρ
σ
−
q˙
q
(1− σ)
σ
.
Since per capita expenditure is constant on the balanced growth path, we set
E˙ = 0 into the previous equation; in addition, we require that q˙/q = −g, which
means that the aggregate consumption price index decreases at the constant
rate g.20 This gives the rate of return to savings:
rsavings = ρ + (σ − 1) g. (27)
20The reader can easily verify that q˙/q = −g by using Eqs. (6), (8) and (18). We observe
that this occurs because labor is the nume´raire in the model. If, alternatively, the aggregate
consumption good C was set as nume´raire, then wages would be exponentially growing at
a rate equal to g.
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Finally, we equalize rR&D to rsavings, that is:
ϑ
(θ − 1) (m− 1)
[(m− 1)θ + 1]
LE
m
= ρ + (σ − 1) g, (28)
which represents the capital market clearing condition.
3.3.2 Equilibrium loci
As mentioned above, we build three equilibrium loci that are useful for char-
acterizing the BGP of the economy. These three curves are obtained in such a
way to eliminate spending per capita, E. The intersection of these three loci,
CME, PR and ZP, gives the growth rate g¯, the mass of ﬁrms m¯, and the mass
of varieties per ﬁrm n¯ in the market equilibrium.
The CME locus This locus is obtained from the labor and the capital
market clearing conditions, Eqs. (26) and (28) respectively. This gives:
g =
ϑ
σ
(
L
m
− nlf − lk
)
−
ρ
σ
. (CME)
The CME curve is a locus of allocations where all the markets clear; however,
since Eqs. (21) and (24) have not been used to derive CME, this locus describes
equilibria for a given mass of ﬁrms m and varieties per ﬁrm n. As the CME
locus shows, the rate of innovation is negatively related to the mass of ﬁrms
m and the mass of varieties per ﬁrm n. The reasons for that are the following.
Increases in m make the market more fragmented ; this reduces ﬁrm size and
leads to a lower rate of return to R&D. Large values of n increase the burden of
proliferation costs limiting the ability to devote resources to R&D (through the
labor market-clearing condition). In both cases, the rate of growth is reduced.
The PR locus This locus is built by requiring that the labor market clears
and the product range is the one that maximizes ﬁrms’ proﬁts. From Eqs.
(21) and (26), we get:
n =
ϑ L
m
− g − ϑlk
ϑlf [(δ − 1)G(m) + 1]
, (PR)
where G(m) = mθ(m−1)+θ−1
mθ(m−1)
. The PR locus gives the mass of varieties per ﬁrm
for given growth rate g and mass of ﬁrms m. Once again, as in the case of
the CME curve, more fragmented markets and a large innovation rate reduce
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the level of product proliferation. In addition, it is important to remark that
increases in the intra-ﬁrm elasticity of substitution δ and in the inter-ﬁrm
elasticity of substitution θ make the product range narrower. When δ takes
larger values, in fact, the varieties produced within each single ﬁrm become
more homogeneous and the cannibalization eﬀect produces a contraction of
the product range. An increase in θ, instead, makes product ranges more
homogeneous and results in a decline in the Lerner index of market power.
This leads ﬁrms to choose a smaller level of product proliferation (strategic
interaction eﬀect): the product range, in fact, is used as an instrument to
mitigate price competition.21
The ZP locus We derive the ZP locus by crossing the zero-proﬁt condition
(24) with the labor market clearing condition (26). We get:
g = ϑ
L
m
1
M (m)
− ϑnlf − ϑlk, (ZP)
where M(m) = θ(m−1)+1
m
. The ZP locus gives the mass of ﬁrms for a given
growth rate g and level of product proliferation n. We observe that the in-
novation rate is inversely related to the size of product range, the mass of
ﬁrms and the inter-ﬁrm elasticity of substitution θ. The reasons for that are
the following. First, if the mass of varieties per ﬁrm gets larger, proliferation
costs increase; in order not to incur losses, ﬁrms have to choose a lower rate
of innovation. Next, whenever the mass of incumbents becomes smaller, proﬁt
margins rise; the consequent increase in the market power allows ﬁrms to sus-
tain higher R&D costs. Finally, if product ranges become more homogeneous,
there is a decline in the market power and the gross-proﬁt eﬀect goes down;
therefore, only a smaller innovation rate is sustainable.
Before proceeding with the analysis of the model, it is useful to characterize
the short-run equilibrium by studying the relation between the mass of ﬁrms
m and the rate of growth g, taking the mass of ﬁrms as given. We perform
this objective by plugging n from (PR) into (CME) and rearranging terms;22
it yields:
g =
[
ϑ L
m
− ϑlk − ρ−
ρ
(δ−1)G(m)
]
[
σ−1
(δ−1)G(m)
+ σ
] .
21At this regard, the reader can easily check that G(m) increases in θ.
22It is important to stress that in order to derive this relationship, we do not use the ZP
locus that plays a crucial role in the determination of the long-run equilibrium of the economy
under free-entry; in our model, in fact, the mass of ﬁrms m is determined endogenously by
a process which drives net proﬁts to zero.
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One can easily check that there is an inverse relationship between g and m;
to explain this result, it is important to take into account two eﬀects. First, a
larger mass of ﬁrms causes a fall in average R&D; this is due to the fact that
less labour resources can be devoted to R&D in more fragmented markets.
Second, we observe that the eﬀect of a change in the mass of varieties of a
producer on the pricing decisions of other ﬁrms is large when m is small; this
implies that each ﬁrm tends to use consistently its product range to limit price
competition in the second stage. Since producers under-expand their product
range by the strategic interaction eﬀect, more resources can be invested in
R&D activities and, consequently, the rate of growth is larger.
3.3.3 Stability of the equilibrium
Following Evans, Honkapohja and Romer (1998), we investigate the stabil-
ity properties of the model by analyzing the dynamics of the economy away
from the steady state when agents have to learn about the location of the
equilibrium. Appendix A.5. shows that a parametric restriction has to be
introduced in order to have a stable equilibrium with a positive growth rate.
This restriction gives rise to Assumption 1:
Assumption 1 The ﬁrm-level ﬁxed cost has to satisfy the following inequal-
ity, that is:
lk >
ρ
ϑ(σ − 1)
.
The role played by the ﬁrm-level ﬁxed cost in Assumption 1 can be explained
as follows. In order to have a stable solution, the rate of return to R&D has to
be larger than the rate of return to savings when the growth rate is below its
equilibrium value; such a situation, in fact, provides the incentive to raise the
rate of innovation until the achievement of an equilibrium, where the two rates
of return are equal. As it is explained more in detail in Appendix A.5., the
rates of return to R&D and savings are both increasing functions of the rate
of innovation; in addition, the ﬁrm-level ﬁxed cost aﬀects positively ﬁrm size
and the rate of return to R&D through the zero-proﬁt condition. This implies
that, when the growth rate is low and the eﬀect of g on rR&D and rsavings is
negligible, the ﬁrm-level ﬁxed cost has to be high enough in order to make the
realized rate of return on R&D investment larger than the rate of return to
savings.
In the following analysis we assume that this Assumption holds.
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Figure 1: Decentralized economy and Social Optimum
3.3.4 Market structure and growth
Now, we reduce the three-dimensional system, given by CME, PR and ZP,
to a two-dimensional system in the mass of ﬁrms, m, and the total mass of
product varieties the market produces, denoted by v = m× n. Combining ZP
with CME and ZP with PR gives respectively:
v =
L
(σ − 1)lf
[
σ
M (m)
− 1
]
−
m
lf
[
lk −
ρ
ϑ(σ − 1)
]
, (V1)
v =
L
[
1− 1
M(m)
]
lf (δ − 1)G(m)
. (V2)
We draw these two relations, V1 and V2, in the (m, v) plane. Since M ′(m) > 0
and G′(m) < 0, the V1 and V2 loci are respectively decreasing and increasing
in m.23 In Figure 1, the intersection of these two relations gives the equilibrium
values for v and m.
It is important to observe that, when the mass of competitors becomes
very large, M(m) and G(m) tend respectively to θ and 1; this means that the
V1 locus shifts down while the V2 locus becomes ﬂat. Our model converges to
23Observe that in the V1 locus lk >
ρ
ϑ(σ−1) by Assumption 1.
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monopolistic competition because strategic interactions across multi-product
ﬁrms disappear.
Once the masses of ﬁrms and product varieties are determined, the equi-
librium mass of varieties, n¯, is simply obtained as v¯/m¯. Plugging m¯ and n¯
into the CME locus yields the equilibrium growth rate, g¯.
Before turning our attention to the social welfare analysis, it is worth study-
ing the impact of the population size L on the main economic variables and
check for the scale eﬀect in the model. Now, an increase in the labor force
L shifts the V1 and V2 curves upward, so that the total mass of product
varieties in the market equilibrium v¯ raises. Since we are not able to know
the sign of the change in m¯ by means of a graphical treatment of the model,
we perform some comparative-static exercises, whose details are contained in
Appendix A.6.. Here, we show that an increase in population raises the mass
of ﬁrms, the mass of varieties per ﬁrm and the growth rate in equilibrium. An
interesting property of our model is that this (positive) scale eﬀect vanishes
asymptotically; in fact, we ﬁnd out that as L increases and m¯ becomes large,
growth becomes independent of the size of the labor force because the growth
rate of the oligopolistic economy tends to the one of monopolistic competition:
ϑlk (δ − 1) (θ − 1)− ρ(δ − θ)
σδ − 1− θ (σ + δ − 2)
.
The direct implication of this result is that growth is not explosive if population
grows exponentially.
4 Welfare
A social planner seeking to achieve the ﬁrst best maximizes utility of a typical
consumer evaluated under symmetry.
Using Eqs. (2), (3), (10), instantaneous utility C can be written as C =
lxhm
θ
θ−1n
δ
δ−1 . Assuming that the social planner has access to a large set of
instruments, the social planning solution can be described as the result of
choosing the sequences of lr, m and n to maximize the lifetime utility function
subject to the accumulation technology of ﬁrm-speciﬁc knowledge h˙ = ϑlrh
and the labor market constraint Eq. (26). From this maximization problem
(Appendix B1) we get three relations, CME∗, PR∗ and ZP∗; they represent
respectively the counterparts of CME, PR and ZP in the decentralized econ-
omy.
CME∗ gives the optimal growth rate g for given mass of ﬁrms m and
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varieties per ﬁrm n:
g =
ϑ
σ
(
L
m
− nlf − lk
)
−
ρ
σ
. (CME∗)
PR∗ gives the optimal mass of varieties per ﬁrm n for given mass of ﬁrms m
and growth rate g:
n =
ϑ L
m
− g − ϑlk
ϑlfδ
. (PR∗)
Finally, ZP∗ gives the optimal mass of ﬁrms m for given growth rate g and
mass of products per ﬁrm n:
g = ϑ
(
1
θ
L
m
− nlf − lk
)
. (ZP∗)
The growth rate g∗, the mass of ﬁrms m∗, and the mass of varieties per ﬁrm
n∗ in the social optimum are obtained by the intersection of these three loci,
CME∗, PR∗ and ZP∗.
5 Discussion
In this section we compare the market equilibrium with the social optimum.
We ﬁrst focus on the market structure and, by means of a graphical representa-
tion of the two solutions, we show that the market equilibrium is characterized
by an excessive mass of ﬁrms (too much inter-ﬁrm diversity) oﬀering too few
varieties, both individually (too little intra-ﬁrm diversity) and in total. Then,
we look at the innovation rates of the two conﬁgurations, market economy and
social optimum; at this regard, we ﬁnd that ﬁrms under-invest in R&D under
laissez-faire.
5.1 Market Structure
We build the counterparts of the V1 and V2 loci for the social optimum;
combining ZP∗ with CME∗ and ZP∗ with PR∗ gives respectively:
v =
L
(σ − 1)lf
(σ
θ
− 1
)
−
m
lf
[
lk −
ρ
ϑ(σ − 1)
]
, (V1∗)
v =
L
(
1− 1
θ
)
lf (δ − 1)
. (V2∗)
We observe that the V1∗ locus is decreasing in m; V2∗, instead, is a horizontal
line. The intersection of these two curves gives the values of v and m in
24
Topics in Macroeconomics , Vol. 6 [2006], Iss. 3, Art. 4
http://www.bepress.com/bejm/topics/vol6/iss3/art4
the social optimum. It is straightforward to check that V1 lies always above
V1∗ because M(m) < θ; in addition, V2 lies always below V2∗ and tends
asymptotically to it for very large values of m. We observe that in a model
of monopolistic competition the V1 and V2 loci coincide respectively with
V1∗ and V2∗; this means that in a monopolistically competitive economy,
the equilibrium market structure coincides with the one chosen by the social
planner. As Figure 1 shows, v∗ > v¯ and m∗ < m¯; this implies that n∗ > n¯.
In other terms, in the decentralized economy there is an excessive mass of
ﬁrms oﬀering too few varieties, both individually and in total. This result is
summarized in the following Proposition:
Proposition 1 In presence of multi-product enterprises, the market equilib-
rium involves too many ﬁrms and too few products per ﬁrm with respect to the
social optimum. In addition, the total mass of varieties in the decentralized
economy is ineﬃciently low.
The intuition behind Proposition 1 may be obtained by shedding light on the
eﬀects that a new ﬁrm’s entry produces on the incumbents’ behavior. First,
there is the well-known business stealing externality because an individual ﬁrm
does not internalize the proﬁt reductions that its operation imposes on other
ﬁrms when it decides whether to enter an industry; clearly, this represents a
tendency toward over-entry.24 Then, we have the consumer surplus externality
consisting in the fact that an entrant is not able to extract the whole surplus
associated with the production of its product range; consequently, this force
pushes toward under-entry. Finally, there is an additional externality whereby
an entrant generates a contraction of the product ranges of existing ﬁrms;25
this is a tendency toward insuﬃcient product variety per ﬁrm and over-entry.
The net eﬀect of these forces leads to excessive entry, too narrow product
ranges, and too low product variety.
It is interesting to observe that our ﬁndings are in accordance with the
ones obtained by Anderson and de Palma (1992) for the nested multinomial
logit demand model (see Proposition 3 at page 270).26
24For the business stealing eﬀect, the reader is referred to Mankiw and Whinston (1986).
25For ﬁrms, the net value of an additional variety in the product range is zero via the
FOC for the proﬁt-maximizing choice of product line. On the contrary, the contraction of
the product ranges involves a loss in the consumer surplus because the social value of the
variants that are not more produced is strictly positive.
26Diﬀerently from us, Anderson and de Palma (1992) develop their analysis within a
partial equilibrium framework and, above all, do not deal with innovation and economic
growth.
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5.2 Growth
To get the intuition of the forces at work when we compare the innovation
rate of the market equilibrium with the one realized by the social planner, we
now focus on the CME locus since it coincides with its counterpart CME∗. We
have shown two results: (i) too much inter-ﬁrm diversity, that is m∗ < m¯, and
(ii) too little intra-ﬁrm diversity, that is n∗ > n¯. Now, the ﬁrst result leads
to R&D under-investment in the decentralized economy (plug (i) into CME);
too many ﬁrms operating in the market equilibrium reduce the innovation
rate below the optimum (market fragmentation). The second result, instead,
leads to over-investment in R&D (plug (ii) into CME); too few varieties per
ﬁrm in the market equilibrium reduce the burden of the proliferation costs
and, consequently, a larger number of workers in the decentralized economy
can be employed in R&D activities. Since the algebraic solution for g¯ is quite
complicated, it is not straightforward to make a direct comparison between
g¯ and g∗; we focus on this issue in Appendix B2 where it is shown that the
innovation rate in the market economy is insuﬃciently low. This result is
summarized in the following Proposition:
Proposition 2 In presence of multi-product enterprises, the incentive to in-
novate is lower in the market economy than in the social optimum; therefore,
there is too little growth under laissez-faire.
Proof. See Appendix B2.
Some intuitive insight into Proposition 2 may be obtained by observing that, in
this model, the rate of cost reduction depends on the scale of the R&D activity
undertaken by each individual ﬁrm; dynamic increasing returns are internal to
the ﬁrm and economic growth depends on average R&D, not aggregate R&D.
Now, the larger mass of ﬁrms realized in the market equilibrium induces dis-
persion of R&D resources; this limits exploitation of scale economies internal
to the ﬁrm and slows down growth. In other words, the excessive fragmen-
tation of market structure in the decentralized economy reduces the ability
to apply resources to innovation and represents the source of the economic
under-performance in the market equilibrium.
As previously observed, as the mass of ﬁrms becomes large, the V1 and
V2 curves become similar to their counterparts V1∗ and V2∗; the market
solutions for m, v and n coincide with the ones chosen by the social planner.
Now, plugging these results into the CME locus gives the same growth rate
in two conﬁgurations, market economy and social optimum. Therefore, we
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can conclude that a monopolistically competitive economy achieves Pareto
optimality in all the regards: R&D investment, ﬁrms’ entry, and provision of
product varieties.
5.3 Comparison with Peretto (1999)
Here, we compare the normative results of our model with the ones found by
Peretto (1999) (see Result 4 in Peretto, 1999, page 192).
In Peretto (1999), the price elasticity of demand perceived by oligopolistic
ﬁrms is lower than the elasticity of product substitution. This distortion, which
represents the source of the divergence between the social optimum and the
decentralized equilibrium, makes competition softer and leads to a lower rate
of return to R&D. Since ﬁrms spend too little on R&D, the rate of return to
entry becomes too high and too many producers enter the market. Therefore,
the economy described by Peretto (1999) is Pareto ineﬃcient because there are
insuﬃcient growth and excessive variety; moreover, as the number of ﬁrms goes
to inﬁnity, the price elasticity of demand converges to the elasticity of product
substitution and the decentralized equilibrium tends to the social optimum.
As already mentioned in the Introduction, in our model the market pro-
vides globally too little variety, although there are over-entry into the industry
and insuﬃcient growth like in Peretto (1999). At this regard, we observe that
in Peretto (1999) the result of excessive entry translates into a too large prod-
uct variety because there exists a one-to-one correspondence between ﬁrm and
variety; in fact, ﬁrms produce a single variety and there is no cannibalization
eﬀect at work in his model. In our paper, instead, over-entry into the industry
does not lead to excessive variety because we allow each ﬁrm to produce more
than one variety; in fact, in presence of multi-product ﬁrms, the entry decision
of a potential competitor and the choice of product range are interdependent:
a new entrant leads to a contraction of existing ﬁrms’ product ranges and this,
in turn, induces entry. This explains why in our set-up, ﬁrms oﬀer too little
product varieties, both individually and in total, although the market accom-
modates too many enterprises. However, convergence to the social optimum
occurs also in our model, because the cannibalization eﬀect and the strate-
gic interaction eﬀect, that are responsible for the under-expansion of ﬁrms’
product ranges, vanish as the mass of ﬁrms goes to inﬁnity.
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6 Conclusions
In this paper, we develop a general equilibrium model of endogenous growth
in order to analyze an economy with multi-product ﬁrms which carry out
in-house R&D programs intended for the achievement of cost-reducing inno-
vations. Multi-product enterprises compete a` la Bertrand on the product
market. Each ﬁrm co-ordinates its pricing decisions across all the varieties
produced in order to maximize overall proﬁts. In doing so, ﬁrms internalize
competition within their product lines; at this regard, our analysis identiﬁes
the cannibalization eﬀect which any given product generates upon other prod-
uct lines of the same ﬁrm. In addition, we allow for inter-ﬁrm competition; in
fact, we model multi-product ﬁrms as large actors which interact strategically
on the product market. In such a framework, the mass of ﬁrms as well as
the mass of product varieties per ﬁrm are endogenous and jointly determine
market structure in equilibrium.
In the comparison between social optimum and decentralized economy, we
show that the market equilibrium involves too many ﬁrms and too few prod-
ucts per ﬁrm; in addition, we ﬁnd that under laissez-faire the total mass of
varieties and productivity growth are ineﬃciently low. Therefore, in our model
under-investment in R&D is accompanied by under-provision of product va-
rieties; the latter result occurs both at the ﬁrm level and at the level of the
whole economy. In absence of technological externalities, such as knowledge
spillovers across ﬁrms, our ﬁndings are driven by the fact that ﬁrms interact
strategically on the product market. Multi-product enterprises choose ineﬃ-
ciently narrow product ranges in order to internalize the cannibalization eﬀect
and relax price competition: this exacerbates excessive entry of ﬁrms since
the choice of product range and the entry decision of a potential competi-
tor are interdependent. The resulting market fragmentation limits the ability
to invest resources in R&D and, consequently, the market provides too lit-
tle growth. Decentralization of the ﬁrst-best social optimum thus requires
subsidies to promote the creation of product varieties and R&D activities by
individual ﬁrms; in addition, an entry fee increasing the cost of entry is wel-
fare improving.27 At this regard, it is interesting to shed light on some recent
studies whose normative results are consistent with the policy implications
of our model. Starting from the seminal contribution of Chamberlin (1933),
a great deal of theoretical research shows that free entry can lead to social
27In order to achieve the optimal number of industry participants, one can think of a
diﬀerent setting where the only form of industry regulation is given by the determination of
the number of operating licenses that are awarded. In our model, entry restrictions increase
welfare.
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ineﬃciency (see, e.g., Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977; Mankiw and Whinston, 1986;
Anderson, de Palma and Nesterov, 1995). From the empirical side, Berry
and Waldfogel (1999) recently quantify ineﬃciency associated to free entry by
considering data from the radio industry in the United States. The empiri-
cal results show a large degree of business stealing by new stations, which in
turn implies a large welfare loss (to market participants) from free entry. The
authors ﬁnd out that the there is excessive entry into the radio industry and
welfare loss from free entry, as opposed to the social optimum, is about 40%
of industry revenue, which suggests that entry restrictions are welfare improv-
ing. Mowery and Rosenberg (1989) provide evidence on the fact that excessive
fragmentation of market structure limits ability to apply resources to innova-
tion. The authors show how a period of market restructuring occurred across
all U.S. industrial sectors at the beginning of the 20th century; the increased
market control stimulated innovative activity by allowing the accumulation of
resources by the ﬁrm. There were, in fact, a widespread expansion of R&D
departments and a general increase of innovative activity.
The idea that entry fees to discipline entry could be introduced by gov-
ernments to achieve social optimality is also consistent with the conclusions
of some recent papers. As concerning the literature on multi-product ﬁrms,
Anderson and de Palma (1992, 2006) show that the market system attracts
too many ﬁrms with too few products per ﬁrm; this conclusion suggests that
entry fees and subsidies to promote product varieties increase welfare. As
regards the literature on economic growth and R&D, in Peretto (1999) the
Pareto ineﬃciency of the economy is characterized by insuﬃcient growth and
excessive entry, which implies that an R&D subsidy and an entry fee increasing
the cost of entry are necessary to restore Pareto optimality. In two compan-
ion papers, Etro (2005, 2006) develop a Schumpeterian growth model where
incumbent patentholders are leaders in the patent races, invest in R&D, and
enjoy a monopolistic position that is partially persistent. The author describes
an equilibrium characterized by an ineﬃcient bias toward too small ﬁrms in
the market for innovation; in these papers, Etro shows that the social optimum
can be achieved with two policy tools, an R&D subsidy, which optimally allo-
cates resources between investors and an entry fee, which targets the optimal
number of ﬁrms.28
28In Etro (2005), the author outlines that the dynamic ineﬃciency of the growth process is
able to explain why a country with an industrial structure characterized by small enterprises
does not achieve eﬃcient results. The author observes that this conclusion is interesting
at the light of the low growth performance of countries that lack large and innovative
corporations. Etro concludes that this is the case of many European countries, and in
particular Italy, whose industrial structure is characterized by a great number of small
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Despite we simultaneously model the accumulation of ﬁrm-speciﬁc knowl-
edge, the entry decisions of new ﬁrms and the product choices of multi-product
ﬁrms, the framework developed in this paper remains still tractable and is
suitable for studying other interesting issues that deserve to be further in-
vestigated. In the current paper, for instance, we abstract from knowledge
spillovers which aﬀect the appropriability of the returns from innovation and
potentially play a role in the determination of market structure. In presence
of multi-product ﬁrms, in fact, market structure may range from concentrated
equilibria (in which either one or a small mass of ﬁrms each produce many va-
rieties) to fragmented equilibria (in which a large mass of ﬁrms produce either
one or a small range of varieties): an issue, that we plan to address in future
research, regards the analysis of how changes in the technological appropri-
ability and opportunity conditions contribute to the appearance of the various
possible equilibria.
Appendix A
A.1. Calculations for the demand elasticities
Transforming the demand function Xij (9) into logarithms, we have:
lnXij = (θ − 1) ln q + lnLE − δ ln pij − (θ − δ) ln qi.
Given Eq. (6), it is easy to show that ∂ ln qi/∂ ln pij = (pij/qi)
1−δ. Therefore,
the eﬀect of pij on the market price index q is:
∂ ln q
∂ ln pij
=
∂ ln q
∂ ln qi
∂ ln qi
∂ ln pij
=
(
qi
q
)1−θ (
pij
qi
)1−δ
.
We have the following expressions for the elasticities:
∂ lnXij
∂ ln pij
= −δ − (θ − δ)
(
pij
qi
)1−δ
+ (θ − 1)
(
qi
q
)1−θ (
pij
qi
)1−δ
, (A.1)
∂ lnXik
∂ ln pij
= − (θ − δ)
(
pij
qi
)1−δ
+ (θ − 1)
(
qi
q
)1−θ (
pij
qi
)1−δ
, for k = j. (A.2)
and medium size enterprises whose innovative capacity is quite limited. It is interesting to
observe that our model shares the same normative conclusions of Etro (2005) although the
growth set-up is quite diﬀerent.
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These calculations are important for ﬁrm’s pricing strategy; each producer, in
fact, internalizes the eﬀects of competition both within its product line and
between ﬁrms within the industry.
A.2. Dynamic optimization problem
The Current Value Hamiltonian for the maximization problem of ﬁrm i is:
Hi =
∫ ni
j=0
(pijXij − lxij) dj − lri − nilf + µiϑlrihi,
where pij and lrij are the control variables (for every j ∈ [0, ni]), hi the state
variable, µi the co-state variable associated to the dynamic constraint. Let us
consider variety j for ﬁrm i; the optimality conditions are:
∂Hi
∂pij
= 0 ⇒ Xij +
∫ ni
j=0
(
pik −
1
hi
)
∂Xik
∂pij
dj = 0, (A.3)
∂Hi
∂lri
= 0 ⇒ 1 = µiϑhi, (A.4)
µ˙i = rµi −
∂Hi
∂hi
⇒ rµi =
∂πi
∂hi
+ µiϑlri + µ˙i, (A.5)
lim
t→∞
R(t)µihi = 0. (A.6)
We interpret economically conditions Eqs. (A.3)-(A.6).
Condition (A.3) tells us how ﬁrm i sets the variety j’s price. To derive this
condition, the eﬀect of variety j’s price upon the demand schedules of all the
other varieties manufactured by ﬁrm i is taken into account.
Condition (A.4) regards the decision of investing in R&D targeted at the
accumulation of ﬁrm-speciﬁc knowledge: more precisely, it says that the value
of the marginal product of labor engaged in R&D activities has to be equal to
its marginal cost.
Condition (A.5) represents a no-arbitrage condition telling that it is equiv-
alent to invest an amount of money equal to µi on the capital market, receiving
a return equal to rµi, or in the creation of new ﬁrm-speciﬁc knowledge: in this
case, there is a positive eﬀect of the knowledge on proﬁts, a positive eﬀect on
the accumulation of further knowledge and the capital gain µ˙i.
Condition (A.6) is the usual transversality condition; it requires that at
the end of the planning horizon ﬁrm-speciﬁc knowledge has no value.
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A.3. Omitted details in the solution of the second stage of the game
Now, we use the results of the dynamic ﬁrm’s optimization problem to de-
termine the optimal pricing strategy and the return to R&D activity. This
corresponds to solving the second stage of the game.
Using Eqs. (A.1) and (A.2), Eq. (A.3) becomes:
Xij −
δXij
pij
(
pij −
1
hi
)
+
−
∫ ni
k=0
Xik
pij
(
pik −
1
hi
)[
θ − δ − (θ − 1)
(
qi
q
)1−θ](
pij
qi
)1−δ
dk = 0, (A.7)
which, by using Eq. (9), can be rewritten as:
LE
q1−θ
q1−θi −δ
LEq1−θi
q1−θ
(
pij−
1
hi
)
pij
=
∫ ni
k=0
Xik
(
pik −
1
hi
) [
θ − δ − (θ − 1)
(
qi
q
)1−θ]
dk.
One can observe that the right hand side of this equation is the same for all
j ∈ [0, ni]. This implies that pij = pi for all j ∈ [0, ni]; consequently, the term
(pij/qi)
1−δ in Eq. (A.7) becomes equal to 1/ni. Using Eqs. (6) and (8), we
get: (
qi
q
)1−θ
=
n
1−θ
1−δ
i p
1−θ
i(∫ m
i=0
n
1−θ
1−δ
i p
1−θ
i di
) . (A.8)
Then, Eq. (A.7) can be simpliﬁed as:
pi =
1
hi
[θ − (θ − 1)i]
(θ − 1) (1− i)
, (A.9)
where i =
(
qi
q
)1−θ
.
Finally, we determine the rate of return to R&D investment; this can be
obtained from Eqs. (A.4) and (A.5) as follows. We divide both sides of eq.
(A.5) by µi to get:
r =
1
µi
∂πi
∂hi
+ ϑlri +
µ˙i
µi
= ϑhi
∂πi
∂hi
+ ϑlri −
h˙i
hi
,
where we use the fact that µi = 1/ (ϑhi) according to Eq. (A.4). In the
previous equation, the term ∂πi/∂hi equals:
∂πi
∂hi
= −
∫ ni
j=0
∂lxij
∂hi
dj =
∫ ni
j=0
Xij
h2i
dj,
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since lxij = Xij/hi by Eq. (10); therefore, the rate of return to R&D can be
written as:
r = ϑhi
∫ ni
j=0
Xij
h2i
dj + ϑlri −
h˙i
hi
= ϑ
∫ ni
j=0
lxij dj + ϑlri −
h˙i
hi
.
The rate of return to R&D presents three components. First, there is the eﬀect
of innovation on the cash ﬂow (the term ϑ
∫ ni
j=0
lxij dj). Second, it is important
to observe the eﬀect of R&D on the process of knowledge accumulation (the
term ϑlri). In fact, investing in R&D allows ﬁrms to increase their level of
knowledge; this contributes to improve the eﬃciency of production and stimu-
lates the process of accumulation of ﬁrm-speciﬁc knowledge. Finally, we have
the change in the value of knowledge (the term −h˙i/hi); this term captures the
fact that if the value of knowledge increases (decreases) over time, investing
in R&D becomes more (less) attractive.
By using Eq. (11), the expression for the rate of return to R&D simpliﬁes
and becomes:
r = ϑ
∫ ni
j=0
lxij dj,
which corresponds with Eq. (14) in the text.
A.4. Omitted details in the solution of the ﬁrst stage of the game
In the following, we look at the ﬁrst stage of the game that consists in de-
termining the level of proliferation per ﬁrm, given the decisions taken in the
second stage.
Eq. (A.9) implies that the inverse of the mark-up can be written as:
pi
pi − 1/hi
= θ − i(θ − 1). (A.10)
By using Eqs. (6), (8), (9), (10), (A.9) and (A.10), the gross proﬁts of ﬁrm i
can be written as:
πi = ni(piXi − lxi)− lri − nilf − lk
= LE
i
(
pi −
1
hi
)
pi
− lri − nilf − lk
= LE
[
1−
θ
(θ − 1)
1
pihi
]
− lri − nilf − lk.
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Diﬀerentiation of πi with respect to ni yields the ﬁrst order condition:
∂πi
∂ni
= LE
θ
(θ − 1)
1
p2ihi
∂pi
∂ni
− lf = 0. (A.11)
Summing (A.10) over i gives:∫ m
i=0
pi
pi − 1/hi
di = 1 + (m− 1)θ.
Diﬀerentiating this equation with respect to ni yields:∫ m
k=0
∂pk
∂ni
dk = 0. (A.12)
Under symmetry, pi = p, hi = h and ni = n for every i; then, Eq. (A.10)
becomes:
p
p− 1/h
= θ −
(θ − 1)
m
. (A.13)
and Eq. (A.12) can be written as:
(m− 1)
∂pj
∂ni
+
∂pi
∂ni
= 0. (A.14)
By rearranging Eq. (A.10), we get:
pi
pi−1/hi
− θ
pj
pj−1/hj
− θ
=
i
j
=
n
1−θ
1−δ
i p
1−θ
i
n
1−θ
1−δ
j p
1−θ
j
.
Cross-multiplying the terms of this equation and then diﬀerentiating with
respect to ni gives:[
1/hj
(pj − 1/hj)
2n
1−θ
1−δ
i p
1−θ
i + (1− θ)
(
pi
pi − 1/hi
− θ
)
n
1−θ
1−δ
j p
−θ
j
]
∂pj
∂ni
=
[
1/hi
(pi − 1/hi)
2n
1−θ
1−δ
j p
1−θ
j + (1− θ)
(
pj
pj − 1/hj
− θ
)
n
1−θ
1−δ
i p
−θ
i
]
∂pi
∂ni
+
(θ − 1)
(δ − 1)
(
pj
pj − 1/hj
− θ
)
n
δ−θ
1−δ
i p
1−θ
i .
This equation, combined with Eq. (A.14), becomes:
m
(m− 1)
[
1/h
(p− 1/h)2
n
1−θ
1−δ p1−θ + (1− θ)
(
p
p− 1/h
− θ
)
n
1−θ
1−δ p−θ
]
∂pi
∂ni
= −
(θ − 1)
(δ − 1)
(
p
p− 1/h
− θ
)
n
δ−θ
1−δ p1−θ.
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Finally, using Eq. (A.13) into the previous equation gives:
∂pi
∂ni
=
(θ − 1)
(δ − 1)
p
n
[
m− 1
mθ(m− 1) + θ − 1
]
. (A.15)
One can observe that an increase in the level of a ﬁrm’s proliferation raises the
ﬁrm’s own price and reduces the prices of other ﬁrms according to Eq. (A.14).
Plugging ∂pi/∂ni from Eq. (A.15) into the ﬁrst order condition Eq. (A.11)
yields Eq. (20) in the text. The proﬁt-maximizing mass of varieties produced
by each ﬁrm is:
n =
LE (m− 1)2 (θ − 1) θ
lf (δ − 1) [(m− 1)θ + 1] [mθ(m− 1) + θ − 1]
.
A.5. Stability of the equilibrium
Combining Eq. (21) with Eq. (25) yields:
nlf = nlx
mθ(m− 1)
(δ − 1) [mθ(m− 1) + θ − 1]
. (A.16)
Plugging Eqs. (A.16) and (25) into the zero proﬁt condition (24) gives:
nlx =
(g
ϑ
+ lk
)[ 1
M(m) − 1
−
1
(δ − 1)G(m)
]
−1
.
where ﬁrm size nlx depends positively on the rate of growth g and the ﬁrm-level
ﬁxed cost lk. The reason is that R&D expenditure, which is a sunk cost that
is borne at each moment in time, and the ﬁrm-level ﬁxed cost aﬀect negatively
incumbent’s proﬁts and lead to a smaller mass of the active ﬁrms (larger ﬁrm
size) through the zero-proﬁt condition.
Now, the expression for ﬁrm size can be used into Eq. (23) to obtain the
rate of return to R&D:
rR&D = ϑ
(g
ϑ
+ lk
)[ 1
M(m)− 1
−
1
(δ − 1)G(m)
]
−1
. (A.17)
It is interesting to observe that this rate of return depends positively on the
rate of growth and the ﬁrm-level ﬁxed cost. As Eq. (27) shows, the rate of
return on savings is also increasing in the rate of innovation.
Eqs. (27) and (A.17) are depicted in the space (r, g); in Figure 2 we label
these two relations RC and RF respectively. Consider a situation in which
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Figure 2: Stability of the equilibrium
the growth rate is below the equilibrium growth rate. In such a situation,
the realized rate of return on R&D activity exceeds the rate of return on con-
sumers’ savings. Observing this, ﬁrms realize that they can invest in projects
with a higher rate of return than required by consumers; at the same time,
consumers can save more at a higher rate of return than required. This gives
rise to an adjustment process of expectations that ends only when the equilib-
rium is achieved; we observe that the opposite occurs when the growth rate is
above the equilibrium growth rate. Obviously, this logic applies only when the
RC locus intersects the RF locus from below; in fact, if this does not occur,
the adjustment process takes the economy away from the equilibrium. There-
fore, stability requires that the RC locus is steeper than the RF locus, that is
σ − 1 >
[
1
M(m)−1
− 1
(δ−1)G(m)
]
−1
. Moreover, the growth rate is positive when
the intercept on the vertical axis of the RF locus is higher than the one of the
RC locus; this occurs when
[
1
M(m)−1
− 1
(δ−1)G(m)
]
−1
> ρ
ϑlk
. Consequently, we
apply the following parameter restriction:
σ − 1 >
[
1
M(m)− 1
−
1
(δ − 1)G(m)
]
−1
>
ρ
ϑlk
, (A.18)
which gives rise to Assumption 1:
lk >
ρ
ϑ(σ − 1)
.
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A.6. Some comparative-static exercises
In this Appendix, we study the impact of the population size L on the main
economic variables and check for the scale eﬀect in the model. We reduce the
three-dimensional system, given by CME, PR and ZP, to a two-dimensional
system in the mass of ﬁrms, m, and the growth rate, g. Combining ZP with
CME and ZP with PR gives respectively:
g = ϑ
L
m
(
1−
1
M
)
1
(σ − 1)
−
ρ
(σ − 1)
, (A.19)
g = ϑ
L
m
[
1
M
+
1
M(δ − 1)G
−
1
(δ − 1)G
]
− ϑlk, (A.20)
where M = θ(m¯−1)+1
m¯
and G = m¯θ(m¯−1)+θ−1
m¯θ(m¯−1)
. Totally diﬀerentiating Eqs. (A.19)
and (A.20) with respect to L and rewriting the result in a matrix form yield:
Γ ·
[
dm
dL
dg
dL
]
=
[
ϑ
m
(
1− 1
M
)
1
(σ−1)
ϑ
m
[
1
M
+ 1
M(δ−1)G
− 1
(δ−1)G
] ] ,
where Γ is equal to:
Γ ≡
[
ϑ L
m2
(
1− 1
M
)
1
(σ−1)
− ϑ L
m
M ′
M2
1
(σ−1)
1
ϑ L
m2
[
1
M
+ 1
M(δ−1)G
− 1
(δ−1)G
]
+ ϑ L
m
[
M ′
M2
+ M
′
M2(δ−1)G
+ G
′
M(δ−1)G2
− G
′
(δ−1)G2
]
1
]
.
Applying the Cramer’s rule, we have:
dm¯
dL
=
|Γ1|
|Γ|
,
dg¯
dL
=
|Γ2|
|Γ|
,
where Γi is a transformed matrix with the solution column replacing column
i of matrix Γ. After some computations, we get:
|Γ| = −ϑ L
m2
[
1
M
+ 1
M(δ−1)G
− 1
(δ−1)G
−
(
1− 1
M
)
1
(σ−1)
]
+
−ϑ L
m
[
M ′
M2
+ M
′
M2(δ−1)G
− G
′
(δ−1)G2
(
1− 1
M
)
+ M
′
M2
1
(σ−1)
]
,
|Γ1| = −
ϑ
m
[
1
M
− 1
(δ−1)G
(
1− 1
M
)
−
(
1− 1
M
)
1
(σ−1)
]
,
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|Γ2| = −ϑ
L
m
M ′
M2
1
(σ−1)
ϑ
m
[
1
M
− 1
(δ−1)G
(
1− 1
M
)]
+
− ϑ
m
(
1− 1
M
)
1
(σ−1)
{
ϑ L
m
[
M ′
M2
+ M
′
M2(δ−1)G
− G
′
(δ−1)G2
(
1− 1
M
)]}
.
It is easy to check that the determinants of matrices Γ, Γ1 and Γ2 are smaller
than zero under the parameter restriction (A.18). Consequently, we get that
dm¯
dL
> 0 and dg¯
dL
> 0; this means that an increase in population raises the mass
of ﬁrms and the growth rate. However, this (positive) scale eﬀect vanishes
asymptotically. We show this feature of the model by expressing the equilib-
rium growth rate g¯ as a function of the equilibrium mass of ﬁrms m¯, g¯(m¯); in
fact, the intersection of CME, PR, and ZP gives:
g¯(m¯) =
Gϑlk (δ − 1) (M − 1)− ρ [1−M + G(δ − 1)]
σ − 1 + Gσ (δ − 1)−M [σ − 1 + G(δ − 1)]
.
Now, as L increases and m¯ becomes large, we have that M and G tend respec-
tively to θ and 1. Consequently, the growth rate of the oligopolistic economy
g¯(m¯) converges to the one of monopolistic competition:
ϑlk (δ − 1) (θ − 1)− ρ(δ − θ)
σδ − 1− θ (σ + δ − 2)
.
The main implication of this result is that growth becomes independent of the
size of the labor force if L is allowed to grow exponentially.
Finally, we study the impact of L on n¯; we rewrite (V1) and (V2) as:
n =
L
m
(σ − 1)lf
( σ
M
− 1
)
−
1
lf
[
lk −
ρ
ϑ(σ − 1)
]
, (A.21)
v =
L
m
(
1− 1
M
)
lf (δ − 1)G
. (A.22)
Totally diﬀerentiating Eqs. (A.21) and (A.22) with respect to L and rewriting
the result in a matrix form yield:
Σ ·
[
dm
dL
dn
dL
]
=
⎡
⎣
1
m
(σ−1)lf
(
σ
M
− 1
)
1
m(1−
1
M )
lf (δ−1)G
⎤
⎦
where Σ ≡
⎡
⎣
L
m2
(σ−1)lf
(
σ
M
− 1
)
+ M
′
M2
σ
L
m
(σ−1)lf
1
− L
lf (δ−1)
[
−
1
m2
(1− 1M )+
M′
M2
1
m
]
G−G
′
m (1−
1
M )
G2
1
⎤
⎦. Applying the Cramer’s
rule, we get:
dm¯
dL
=
|Σ1|
|Σ|
,
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dn¯
dL
=
|Σ2|
|Σ|
,
where Σi is a transformed matrix with the solution column replacing column
i of matrix Σ. After some computations, we get:
|Σ| = L
mlf
{
1
m
[
1
(σ−1)
(
σ
M
− 1
)
− 1
(δ−1)G
(
1− 1
M
)]
+
+M
′
M2
[
1
(δ−1)G
+ σ
(σ−1)
]
− G
′
(δ−1)G2
(
1− 1
M
)} ,
|Σ1| =
1
mlf
[
1
(σ−1)
(
σ
M
− 1
)
− 1
(δ−1)G
(
1− 1
M
)]
,
|Σ2| =
L
m2(δ−1)Gl2
f
[
M ′
M2
− G
′
(σ−1)G
(
1− 1
M
) (
σ
M
− 1
)]
.
One can check that the determinants of matrices Σ, Σ1 and Σ2 are larger
than zero under the parameter restriction (A.18). This implies that dn¯
dL
> 0
and dm¯
dL
> 0 (as conﬁrmed by the previous comparative-static exercise); we
conclude that an increase in population raises the mass of varieties produced
by each ﬁrm.
Appendix B
B.1. Social optimum
Under symmetry within each ﬁrm and across ﬁrms and using the labor market
clearing condition, the current value Hamiltonian can be written as follows:
H =
(
lxhm
θ
θ−1n
δ
δ−1
)1−σ
1− σ
+µϑlrh =
[(
L
mn
− lr
n
− lf −
lk
n
)
hm
θ
θ−1n
δ
δ−1
]1−σ
1− σ
+µϑlrh,
where lr, m and n are the control variables, h the state variable, µ the co-state
variable associated to the dynamic constraint. The optimality conditions are:
∂H
∂lr
= 0 ⇒
C−σm
θ
θ−1n
1
δ−1
ϑ
= µ, (B.1)
∂H
∂m
= 0 ⇒
L
mn
= θ
(
lr
n
+ lf +
lk
n
)
, (B.2)
∂H
∂n
= 0 ⇒
L
mn
= δlf +
lr
n
+
lk
n
, (B.3)
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µ˙ = ρµ−
∂H
∂h
⇒ ρµ = C−σ
[(
L
mn
−
lr
n
− lf −
lk
n
)
m
θ
θ−1n
δ
δ−1
]
+ µϑlr + µ˙,
(B.4)
lim
t→∞
µe−ρth = 0. (B.5)
Diﬀerentiating Eq. (B.1) with respect to time gives:
µ˙
µ
= −σ
C˙
C
+
θ
θ − 1
m˙
m
. (B.6)
Using Eqs. (B.1) and (B.4), we get:
µ˙
µ
= ρ− ϑ
L
m
+ ϑnlf + ϑlk. (B.7)
Now, diﬀerentiating C with respect to time yields:
C˙
C
=
θ
θ − 1
m˙
m
+
l˙x
lx
+
h˙
h
. (B.8)
Since the allocation of labor and the mass of producers are constant, Eqs.
(B.6)-(B.8) give:
g =
ϑ
σ
(
L
mn
− lf −
lk
n
)
−
ρ
σ
, (B.9)
which represents the optimal growth rate g for a given mass of ﬁrms m and
varieties per ﬁrm n since Eqs. (B.2) and (B.3) have not been used to derive
(B.9). It corresponds with the CME∗ locus in the text.
Using Eq. (22) into Eq. (B.3) yields:
n =
ϑ L
m
− g − ϑlk
ϑlfδ
, (B.10)
which gives the optimal mass of products per ﬁrm n for a given growth rate g
and mass of ﬁrms m. It corresponds with the PR∗ locus in the text.
Finally, plugging (22) into (B.2) yields:
g = ϑ
(
1
θ
L
m
− nlf − lk
)
, (B.11)
that gives the optimal mass of producers m for a given growth rate g and mass
of products per ﬁrm n. Relation (B.11) corresponds with the ZP∗ curve in the
text.
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B.2. Proof of Proposition 2
In this Appendix, we show that g¯ < g∗. A direct comparison between g¯ and g∗
is not possible because the solution for g¯ is quite complicated. For this reason,
we follow a diﬀerent procedure; we express g¯ as a function of m¯ (ﬁrst step),
and then we show that g¯(m¯) < g∗ (second step).
As we saw above, the intersection of CME, PR, and ZP gives the equilib-
rium growth rate g¯ as a function of the equilibrium mass of ﬁrms m¯:
g¯(m¯) =
Gϑlk (δ − 1) (M − 1)− ρ [1−M + G(δ − 1)]
σ − 1 + Gσ (δ − 1)−M [σ − 1 + G(δ − 1)]
. (B.12)
By using ZP∗, CME∗, and PR∗, we get the growth rate in the social optimum
g∗:
g∗ =
ϑlk (δ − 1) (θ − 1)− ρ(δ − θ)
σδ − 1− θ (σ + δ − 2)
.
Now, we calculate the derivative of g¯(m¯) with respect to m¯:
dg¯(m¯)
dm¯
=
(δ − 1) [−G′(1−M)2 + M ′G2(δ − 1)] [ϑlk (σ − 1)− ρ]
{σ − 1 + Gσ (δ − 1)−M [σ − 1 + G(δ − 1)]}2
,
which is positive since G′ < 0, M ′ > 0 and [ϑlk (σ − 1)− ρ] > 0 by Assumption
1. Since the growth rate of the oligopolistic economy g¯(m¯) is increasing in m¯
and converges to the one of social optimum g∗ when m¯ becomes inﬁnitely large
(M and G tend respectively to θ and 1 when m¯ goes to inﬁnity), we conclude
that g∗ > g¯.
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